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“A business that makes nothing but money is a poor business.”
-Henry Ford.1
“‘[P]rofit goes with liability,’ meaning that only a person willing to bear a
risk of loss is entitled to claim a profit.”2
Many free-market capitalists believe in the syllogism that if a free market
results in progress, and if progress is good, then by definition a free market
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1. Message From Ford Motor Company Fund and Community Services President Jim
Vella, FORD MOTOR COMPANY FUND & COMMUNITY SERVICES, http://corporate.ford.com/ourcompany/community/ford-fund/presidents-message-401p?releaseId=1244754314736 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2012).
2. Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 615, 620 (1997).
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must be good.3 Two hundred years of economic development support this
proposition.4 The capitalist model, which is premised on free-market
ideology,5 is credited with producing many of the riches enjoyed by society as
a whole.6 Indeed, the pursuit of economic freedom ranks among the primary
motivations for the founding of the United States.7 The corporation has
enabled that pursuit and can be credited with greatly contributing to the
advancement of free-market capitalism.8
Proponents of the corporate enterprise argue that corporations have
benefitted the American economy and, by extension, American society.9
Undoubtedly, the corporation has created economic opportunity for
shareholders,10 and it is undeniable that “America owes much of its early
development to these business enterprises.”11
However, the use of the corporate device has exacted a heavy price on
society, and observers have called its social utility into question.12 Concerns
about abusive practices have resulted in calls for additional regulation of

3. See, e.g., 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2096.30 (2011) [hereinafter FLETCHER] (sharing the view that by striving to
maximize profits, corporations are acting to benefit society).
4. See, e.g., Robert Hessen, Capitalism, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
57, 57 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008) (tracing the history of capitalism).
5. Free-market ideology proposes that prices will adjust according to supply and demand,
and that societal welfare will be maximized at the point where supply equals demand. ANDREW
GILLESPIE, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS 86 (2007). Therefore, governmental intervention is
not advantageous. Id. at 85–86.
6. Hessen, supra note 4, at 59 (noting the proliferation of luxury items as a result of
capitalism).
7. See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 29 (2002) (“[C]olonists
were enticed to an America that was almost entirely owned and operated as a business.”).
8. Hessen, supra note 4, at 57–61 (noting the parallel rise in capitalism and the growth of
industry and the corporation).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM: THE PUBLIC PHASES OF
CORPORATIONS, THEIR USES, ABUSES, BENEFITS, DANGERS, WEALTH, AND POWER, WITH A
DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH
THEY HAVE GIVEN RISE 4–5 (1891) (observing that corporations “have cheapened the
necessaries of life, given quick and easy connection between distant points, developed
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and commerce; created employment for labor, marketed the
products which before were not worth the cost of transportation, lowered the cost of living in
Europe and America, transformed the uninhabited wildernesses into rich farms, towns, cities, and
States; found land worth nothing and made it worth millions, and caused an interchange of the
manufactures, luxuries, literature, arts, sciences, and ideas of the world”).
10. Hessen, supra note 4, at 58.
11. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES, CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2009).
12. COOK, supra note 9, at 78 (calling the corporation “as perfect and heartless a
money-making machine as the wit of man has ever devised”).
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corporations and increased corporate social responsibility (CSR).13 Although
corporations have yielded many great benefits to society, they also have
imposed many substantial burdens.14
This Article contends that traditional legal theories have not adequately
discouraged corporations from making socially undesirable choices and have
not encouraged corporations to take socially responsible action. In response to
the inadequacies of prior law, the CSR movement surfaced as an alternative
and has become an important voice in the effort to call attention to
corporations’ irresponsible and unfettered actions.15 The CSR movement has
contributed to gains in labor,16 environmental,17 and safety policies.18
However, the CSR voice lacks the power of legislation, and without
legislation, its voice lacks legal authority.
Without legislation mandating responsible corporate behavior, corporations
will continue to engage in behavior that is socially undesirable, albeit
profitable, for its shareholders.19 With the benefit of enabling legislation, the
corporate entity can be both a profit-making device for its shareholders and a

13. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Institutions:
Beyond Dodd-Frank, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 13, 16 (2012) (arguing for
mandatory corporate-responsibility requirements); see also GRANT THORNTON, CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A NECESSITY NOT A CHOICE 2 (2008) (advocating the implementation
of CSR).
14. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987)
(describing the Bhopal India leak as “the most devastating industrial disaster in history [that
resulted in] the deaths of over 2,000 persons and injuries of over 200,000 caused by lethal gas
known as methyl isocyanate which was released from a chemical plant operated by Union
Carbide India Limited”).
15. See Press Release, CSRWire, 2009 CSR Year in Review: Corporate
Social Responsibility Solidifies into a Movement (Jan. 20, 2010), available
at http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/28632-2009-CSR-Year-in-Review-Corporate-SocialResponsibility-Solidifies-Into-a-Movement-.
16. See Corporate Social Responsibility & Labor, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org
/99RH4AT0K0 (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
17. See World’s Largest Firms “Acting on Climate Change”’ Analysis Shows, GUARDIAN
(Sept.
14,
2011,
7:16
PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/14/
worlds-largest-firms-climate-change (describing the increasing number of large businesses that
are taking steps to reduce emissions affecting climate change); see also Products and the
http://csr.hasbro.com/sus07-products-and-the-environment.php#
Environment,
HASBRO,
video-1 (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (highlighting Hasbro’s commitment to using environmentally
sustainable products, materials, and packaging).
18. See Basic Approach to Safety, MAZDA, http://www.mazda.com/csr/safety/basic
_position/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (outlining Mazda’s various safety initiatives in the context of
vehicles, people, roads, and infrastructure).
19. See Barclift, supra note 13, at 43.
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responsible corporate citizen.20 This dual function may translate into customer
loyalty, consumer preference, and ultimately corporate profits.21
Part I discusses the corporation’s early role and the debate concerning its
purpose. Part II explores the legal justifications for the pursuit of profit and
discusses how modern financial theory contributed to profit-maximization
efforts. Part III then discusses the failure of traditional legal theories to
provide either adequate public protections or corporate incentives for
responsible action. Finally, Part IV proposes encouraging responsible
corporate action through the use of accounting rules and tax law.
I. BACKGROUND
The idea of CSR as an institutional mechanism to protect societal interests
has been a topic of continuing debate in American legal jurisprudence for
nearly a century.22 In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, the Harvard
Law Review presented a historic academic debate between Professor E.
Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School and Professor Adolf A. Berle of
Columbia Law School regarding corporations’ role in society.23 During this
time period, the American economy roiled in despair as stock values crashed
and unemployment ranks swelled,24 and misery became an uninvited guest in
many homes throughout the country. In response, many blamed corporations
for contributing to the financial uncertainty.25
In their debate, Professors Dodd and Berle diverged on the societal purpose
of corporations. Professor Dodd claimed that the public saw the corporation as
an “economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
20. See THORNTON, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that responsible corporate action benefits
businesses by improving their reputation while also enhancing ethical business practices).
21. Jackie Luan & Kusum L. Ailawadi, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Build
Customer Loyalty?, ADAGE (May 24, 2011), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/corporatesocial-responsibility-build-customer-loyalty/227729/.
22. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. L. 2253, 2254 (1990) (noting that the debate about corporate accountability
commenced in the early 1930s).
23. Id.
24. Gene Smiley, Great Depression, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
supra note 4, at 320, 320 (“[I]n 1933, 25 percent of all workers and 37 percent of all nonfarm
workers were completely out of work.”); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve,
Remarks at the H. Parker Willis Lecture in Economic Policy, Washington and Lee
University: Money, Gold, and the Great Depression (Mar. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200403022/default.htm (“During the
major contraction phase of the Depression, between 1929 and 1933, real output in the United
States fell nearly 30 percent. . . . [T]he unemployment rate rose from about 3 percent to nearly 25
percent . . . .”).
25. See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 317 (2011) (stating that the
New Deal policies enacted in the wake of the Great Depression were aimed at “temper[ing]
corporations’ influence in society”).
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function.”26 In contrast, Professor Berle maintained that “a social-economic
absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe;
and in any case it hardly affords the soundest base on which to construct the
economic commonwealth which industrialism seems to require.”27 Professor
Berle’s position eventually triumphed as the prevailing model in American
corporate jurisprudence.28 Today, however, the question of the corporation’s
role still lingers.29
Throughout the twentieth century, corporations’ management teams
embraced the principle of maximizing shareholder profitability as the
justification for their choices and decisions.30 Although this approach may be
economically beneficial and favorable in some respects, it also has led to
undesirable results, including personal injury, death, and other socially
destructive consequences.31 In fact, corporations have been charged with and
found guilty of criminal conduct,32 polluting the environment,33 and deceiving
consumers.34 As a result, society has had to absorb both the financial and the
nonfinancial costs of corporate decisions.35

26. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1932).
27. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1372 (1932).
28. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, supra note 22, at 2255.
29. See, e.g., C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–79 (2002)
(noting that discussions as to corporations’ societal role have persisted into the twenty-first
century).
30. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
163, 164 (2008) (attributing the widely held tenet that the purpose of corporations is profit
maximization to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).
31. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1987)
(noting that Playtex marketed high-absorbency tampons to increase profits despite its awareness
that such products caused toxic shock syndrome, which led to the plaintiff’s death); Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 105–07 (6th Cir. 1975) (indicating that a corporation continued to
market and sell color televisions despite notice that its product posed a major fire hazard).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 232, 239 (10th Cir.
1986); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Griffin, 401 F.
Supp. 1222, 1224–25 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Metro Mgmt. Corp., 541
F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1976).
33. See Sandy Smith, Tyson Foods Pleads Guilty to 20 Felonies, Agrees to $7.5 Million
Fine, EHS TODAY (June 27, 2003), http://ehstoday.com/news/ehs_imp_36455/.
34. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996).
35. See Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L.
& COM. 1, 51–52 (2004) (contending that corporations that engage in undesirable behavior, such
as “destroying the environment, poisoning employees, and undermining societies,” in an effort to
maximize their wealth lack incentives to internalize costs and are able to successfully pass on any
costs to society).
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The growth of corporate enterprise coincided with the Industrial Revolution,
as the banking, oil, railroad, and steel industries grew.36 Investors embraced
the corporate form during the industrial era because it was an efficient way to
accumulate capital while limiting personal liability.37 However, this period
also witnessed American corporations racing to the bottom of regulatory
environments, meaning that entities sought to incorporate in business-friendly
environments free from regulatory intrusion into internal corporate affairs.38 A
new race, on a global scale, developed during the late twentieth century as
corporations fought to establish their economic presence in the world
marketplace and began to seek out markets in which a lack of regualtions
would allow the exploitation of labor and resources.39
Some criticize corporations for conduct that results in socially unacceptable
consequences. For example, detractors point to corporations’ fight against
food-labeling requirements,40 seat-belt requirements,41 and warning labels.42
CSR proponents argue that corporations must behave responsibly when
choosing among various business alternatives.43 They frequently cite the
transference of costs by corporations onto unwilling participants when a
corporation fails to act responsibly.44 They also maintain that the corporate
enterprise has a broader responsibility extending beyond the limited duty it

36. David Ronnegard, The Legal Ontology of the Corporation as a Description of Its Goal,
and Its Role in Society 10 (INSEAD, Faculty & Research Working Paper 2011/16/ISIC, 2011),
available at http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=47140.
37. Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing
in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1280 (2004).
38. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 41–42 (2000).
39. See, e.g., John C. Knapp, Note, The Boundaries of the ILO: A Labor Rights Argument
for Institutional Cooperation, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 369, 384 (2003) (discussing the new race to
the bottom in the context of regulating the global labor market).
40. See, e.g., Jeffery Young, Movie Theaters Fight to Keep Popcorn from Food-Labeling
TIMES
(Mar.
15,
2011),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com
Rule,
SEATTLE
/html/movies/2014505511_popcorn16.html (detailing the opposition of movie-theater chains to a
regulation that would require theaters to list the calorie content of popcorn).
41. See, e.g., Lindsey Ellerson, To Buckle or Not to Buckle: Debate over Seat Belts on
Buses Heats Up, ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/seatbelt-debatestates-mandate-school-bus-seatbelt-law/story?id=9999072 (noting that school-bus industry
associations have raised arguments about cost and liability in opposition to the installation of seat
belts in school buses).
42. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (detailing a
pesticide manufacturer’s refusal to comply with labeling requirements).
43. See Barclift, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that effective CSR requires decision making
that balances profit maximization against moral and ethical obligations).
44. See Sheehy, supra note 35, at 51–52; see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 4–5 (2001) (describing the multitude of costs
produced by irresponsible corporate actions).
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owes to its shareholders and including duties to employees, suppliers, and the
surrounding community.45
In contrast, CSR opponents argue that excessive regulation stifles creativity
and competitiveness.46 Additionally, opponents assert that regulatory solutions
are burdensome and inefficient.47 They maintain that market-based corrections
result in efficient solutions that benefit all of society, not just corporations’
shareholders.48
Both common law49 and statutory50 rules benefit corporate enterprises. It
seems reasonable, then, that in exchange for the privilege of operating a
business in corporate form, the free transferability of shares, and the perpetual
existence of the corporate entity, corporations should be held accountable to
the public and recognize that they owe the public a duty of good faith, fairness,
and honesty in their decisions and actions. However, without legislation either
mandating responsible conduct or incentivizing responsible conduct through
economic means, corporations will not alter their modus operandi.51 Although
legal, acting solely in the name of profit maximization is irresponsible and
counterproductive to society’s best interests.
Legislatures must give
corporations legal incentives to act with due regard for society and to take
immediate and affirmative steps to minimize externalities. Corporations often
take corrective action only in response to governmental pressure, rather than in
response to market pressure.52

45. Afra Afsharipour, Directors as Trustees of the Nation? India’s Corporate Governance
and Corporate Social Responsibility Reform Efforts, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 955, 1014 (2011).
46. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit Crisis and Failure (Part II),
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 421, 423 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2010/15/LRColl2010n15Arewa.pdf (contending that additional regulations on
corporations should be avoided and suggesting that current regulations, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, have reduced the competitiveness of U.S. companies).
47. Id.
48. IS THE GOOD CORPORATION DEAD? SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
at ix (John W. Houck & Oliver F. Williams eds., 1996) (articulating economist Milton
Friedman’s view that ethical and social values are unrelated, and even harmful, to economic
decisions).
49. The common law business judgment rule is “designed to protect the wide latitude
conferred on a board of directors in handling the affairs of the corporate enterprise. The rule
refers to the judicial policy of deferring to the business judgment of corporate directors in the
exercise of their broad discretion in making corporate decisions.” 3A FLETCHER, supra note 3,
§ 1036.
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 120.14a-8 (2011) (providing the parameters for corporations’
acceptance and rejection of shareholder proposals).
51. See MITCHELL, supra note 44, at 11 (stating that legislative reforms are necessary to
“give corporations incentives to care about the rest of us”).
52. Cf. John V. Jacobi, Competition Law’s Role in Health Care Quality, 11 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 45, 70–71 (2002) (contending that in the context of healthcare, market pressures alone
are insufficient to enhance quality and that government regulation is needed).
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II. THE RELENTLESS PURSUIT OF PROFIT
At the turn of the twentieth century, many began to embrace the concept of
maximizing shareholder value as the justification for corporate actions and
decisions.53 In 1919, the Michigan Supreme Court decided the now-famous
case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,54 a seminal decision in American
jurisprudence which many often cite for the proposition that the increase of
shareholder value is the overriding goal of a corporation.55 This case centered
on Ford’s decision to forego paying a special dividend to its shareholders.56
The plaintiffs, who owned 2000 shares of Ford stock, filed suit against Ford
Motor Company and claimed that they were not adequately represented on
Ford’s board of directors, which was allegedly “dominated and controlled” by
Henry Ford, Ford’s president and majority shareholder.57 The plaintiffs
particularly took issue with Henry Ford’s proclamation that “it [is] to be the
settled policy of the company not to pay in the future any special dividends,
but to put back into the business for the future all of the earnings of the
company, other than the regular dividend of five per cent.”58 The plaintiffs
challenged his unilateral alteration of future dividend policy and opposed his
statement of public benevolence because they claimed that his decision
adversely affected their interests as shareholders.59
Ford’s declaration of a change in dividend policy came at a financially
inexcusable moment for Ford Motor Company, which had just finished its
most profitable year.60 To illustrate, during this time, the company expected an
annual profit of over $60 million.61 It held over $132 million in assets, which
included approximately $54 million of cash on hand, against total liabilities
and capital stock of $20 million, resulting in a surplus of approximately $112
million.62 By any reasonable measure, the company was in a comfortable
position to pay the special dividend without injury to its declaration of social
benevolence.63
53. See supra Part I; see also Smith, supra note 33, at 278, 308–09.
54. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
55. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278
(1998) (noting that the idea of shareholder primacy—that “corporate directors have a fiduciary
duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of its shareholders”—is most often attributed
to Dodge). Professor D. Gordon Smith maintains that the correct interpretation of Dodge is one
that addresses the rights of an oppressed minority shareholder. Id. at 279.
56. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671.
57. Id. at 670–71.
58. Id. at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ford asserted that with the company’s
additional revenue, he intended “to employ . . . more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial
system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes.” Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 683.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 685.
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The court did not disregard the strength of Ford Motor Company’s financial
position, as it ultimately ordered the company to pay the dividend.64 In
oft-quoted language, the Dodge court reasoned,
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote
them to other purposes.65
This language gained currency, and courts and scholars still cite it as the
justification for maximizing shareholder value.66
Although the Michigan Supreme Court rejected Ford’s attempt at social
responsibility in Dodge, it referenced several cases relied on by Ford that
actually support the notion of CSR.67 For example, in Taunton v. Royal
Insurance Co., a shareholder of Royal Insurance Company challenged the
board of directors’ decision to pay for losses resulting from a gunpowder
explosion despite the fact that the insurance policies excluded such accidents
from coverage.68 The record establishes that the explosion damaged
eighty-one insured houses, and that although the directors agreed to pay
claims, the board denied having a legal obligation to make such payments.69
At the time Royal Insurance Company made its payments, the practice of
making payments not required by law or policy was accepted among insurance
companies under the rationale that “it was for the advantage of a company to
deal liberally with customers, even to the extent of paying losses not strictly
within the of terms their policies.”70 The court stated that this was a “matter[]
within the discretion of the board . . . to settl[e] claims; and even if the
payments be called gratuities, it makes no difference if they are gratuities
conducive to the successful conduct of the legitimate business of the

64. Id.
65. Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
66. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423–25 (1993); Kenneth B. Davis,
Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain—A Survey
of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 7–8 (1988); Robert
Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for
Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 3 (2010).
67. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (citing Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); People
ex rel. Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); Steinway v.
Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896); Taunton v. Royal Ins. Co., (1864) 71
Eng. Rep. 413 (Ch.); 2 Hem. & M. 135).
68. Tauton, 71 Eng. Rep. at 413.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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company.”71 The court recognized that company funds must be used for only
legitimate business purposes, but that boards of directors must be free to make
decisions as to what actions are in the best interests of the company.72
Therefore, the Taunton court held that a board of directors may legitimately
make voluntary and non-contractually binding payments in the interests of the
company because such payments contributed to the company’s overall
success.73
The Dodge court also referenced Hawes v. Oakland, another case in which a
corporation acted for the public’s benefit notwithstanding a shareholder’s
complaint.74 In this case, the defendant water company supplied the City of
Oakland with free water for nonessential purposes.75 The plaintiff-shareholder
filed a suit demanding that the company “limit the supply of [free] water . . . to
cases of fire or other great necessity.”76 The plaintiff maintained that the
practice of supplying water free of charge caused “great loss and injury of the
company, to the diminution of the dividends . . . and to the decrease in the
value of their stock.”77
The Court dismissed the case because it found that the directors were acting
within their authority and that the plaintiff lacked standing.78 By dismissing
the complaint, the Court recognized the directors’ authority to make business
decisions in the corporation’s interest, even when such corporate action
furthers a public interest and not just shareholder wealth.79
Although the concept of maximizing shareholder profitability is readily
understood, it is questionable whether so broad a judicial application80 of the
shareholder-maximization theory subsequent to Dodge v. Ford is justified
when considered against these cases.

71. Id. at 415.
72. Id. at 414.
73. Id. at 415.
74. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
75. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 451 (1881).
76. Id. The Court noted that
[t]he foundation of the complaint is that the city of Oakland claims at the hands of the
company water, without compensation, for all municipal purposes whatever, including
watering the streets, public squares and parks, flushing sewers, and the like, whereas it
is only entitled to receive water free of charge in cases of fire or other great necessity.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 462. Discussing early derivative-lawsuit principles, the Court stated that a
shareholder must show that the directors are exceeding the scope of their established authority,
considering or engaging in a fraudulent transaction, acting in their individual interests as opposed
to the corporation’s interest, or engaging in an illegal course of action. Id. at 460.
79. See id. at 461–62.
80. See generally, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(illustrating the success of minority shareholders in compelling a dividend).
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A. Profit: An Evolving and Expanding Definition
No other social device has garnered as much attention as the determination
and the measurement of profit.81 Governments measure profit to tax it,
companies measure profit to gauge performance, and the average person
measures profit to determine disposable income.82 Profit is the fundamental
tenet of capitalism.83
During the pre-industrial era, early conceptions of profit were relatively
simple in format.84 Corporations did not use profits as the basis for decision
making or as a benchmark for evaluating performance.85 One commentator
noted that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accountants lacked interest in
profits and that “an examination of the ledgers of British businessmen has
produced evidence of woeful ineptitude or lack of interest in profit
measurement—probably both.”86 Rather, corporations used accounting purely
for record keeping.87 Historically, “the main demand for accounting data came
from management concerned with internal resource allocation rather than
absentee shareholders keen to assess the overall performance of the
enterprise.”88 Unlike modern practices, there were no income-acceleration
techniques or extraordinary charges associated with the calculation of
profitability during this era.89 Early conceptions of shareholder profitability
81. See, e.g., C.J. Foreman, A Division Among Theorists in Their Analysis of Profit, 34 Q.J.
ECON. 114, 114–17 (1919) (discussing the differences between the three major theories of profit
and demonstrating the breadth of the debate).
82. See, e.g., Richard Winchester, Corporations that Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm Profits
in Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 501 (2010) (discussing corporate
profits in the context of the U.S. tax scheme).
83. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Financialism: A Lecture Delivered at Creighton University
School of Law, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323, 325 (2010) (“[T]he fundamental purpose of
capitalism [i]s a system for the production of goods and services and wealth creation and
distribution.”).
84. See J.R. EDWARDS, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 77 (1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 77, 79. Professor J.R. Edwards notes that even as industry began to develop,
assets and liabilities were excluded from accounting records, profit calculations were haphazard,
profit-and-loss accounts contained items that should not have been included, prepayments and
accruals were ignored, and the general account contained items that should have been included in
the capital account or the profit-and-loss account. Id. at 79–80.
87. Id. at 80; see also ELDON S. HENDERIKSEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY 39 (3d ed. 1977)
(“In earlier periods, bookkeeping provided information mainly for managerial uses . . . .”).
88. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 80.
89. See id. at 89. Another commentator describes the simplicity of determining profitability
at the beginning of the twentieth century:
When, finally, the mine is producing, the revenue from it is spent (a) in paying for
labour and other working costs at ordinary market rates; (b) in paying interest on the
working capital at ordinary market rates, or something more; (c) in surplus profit,
which goes to the prospector, the original subscribers to the syndicate, but chiefly to the
financial controlling house.”
R.A. Lehfeldt, On Financiers’ Profits, 80 ECON. J. 551, 556 (1910).
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were restricted to a consideration of dividend payment policy or to an analysis
of a return of capital.90
The need for measuring profit evolved as business activity, business
structures, and financial theory grew in sophistication.91 Measuring profit
allowed the “business manager to decide whether resources were gainfully
employed.”92 Moreover, measuring profits enabled corporations “to identify
the balance legally available for the payment of dividends . . . [and also served]
as the basis for reporting to creditors and absentee owners.”93
The determination of corporate profitability during the late nineteenth
century and early twentieth century was a comparatively modest and
unsophisticated process.94 During this period, profitability was defined as the
excess of revenues over expenses.95 Unlike modern profit theory,96 there were
no sophisticated measurement conventions in use during this era.97 Instead, the
determination of profit was closer to a cash-basis reckoning than an
accrual-basis determination.98 The concept of profit among shareholders
focused on a strong corporate dividend policy;99 however, profits were to be
distributed to shareholders only after due consideration of the company’s
90. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 111.
91. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 33, 39–40 (stating that “[a]ccounting developed
historically as the needs arose, and changes occurred gradually in accounting techniques and
concepts. But new accounting practices have been necessary to keep pace with changing
economic institutions and relationships and the changing objectives of accounting”).
92. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 76.
93. Id.
94. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 104 (noting that before 1930, accounting was
based on rules, rather than on basic principles).
95. See EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77 (noting that business managers gauged profitability
based on the amount of cash on hand).
96. Modern profit theory consists of various concepts, including capital-asset pricing
models, the Black-Scholes model, the efficient capital market hypothesis, and present value. See
JAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., FINANCIAL & MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING: THE BASIS FOR BUSINESS
DECISIONS 454–55 (15th ed. 2010) (defining present value); Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on
Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 777, 780 (2005) (describing the Black-Scholes model);
Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions
of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 475 (1997) (commenting on the
capital-asset pricing model and the efficient capital market hypothesis).
97. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 33, 104.
98. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77. Accrual-method accounting realizes income
when the taxpayer has earned the income or possesses a legal right to it. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 22 (9th ed. 2009). Cash-basis accounting realizes income when the taxpayer has
actually received the income. Id.; see also Comm’r v. N. Tex. Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 12–14
(1930) (articulating the difference in tax liability generated by the use of either accrual or
cash-basis accounting methods).
99. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 496 (1894) (“The term ‘dividend,’ in
its technical as well as in its ordinary acceptation means that portion of its profits which the
corporation, by its directory, sets apart for ratable division among its shareholders.” (citing
Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76 (1875))); see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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financial needs.100 Other financial products like credit markets, derivative
transactions, and international markets were not in contemplation during this
nascent era. The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression led
Congress to pass the Securities Exchange Act of 1933101 and the Exchange Act
of 1934,102 and to create the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1934.103 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, investors
considered dividend policy and return of capital as primary factors when
The Dodge court recognized that
making an investment decision.104
shareholders’ desire to obtain dividends created tension between shareholders
and management and remarked that “‘[p]rofits earned by a corporation may be
divided among its shareholders, but it is not a violation of the charter if they
are allowed to accumulate and remain invested in the company’s business.’”105
As one early measurement of profits, cash-basis accounting gained
recognition from legislatures and courts because it helped protect the rights of
creditors who dealt with corporations.106 In response, courts and legislatures
fashioned several devices to protect the rights of creditors. First, under certain
circumstances, directors could be held personally liable for making
distributions and draining the corporation of cash.107 Second, in contrast to
modern practices that significantly reduce par values, which have been
recorded at one cent,108 par values during the nineteenth century were
100. Mobile, 153 U.S. at 496–97.
101. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77 (2006)).
102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
103. Id. § 4(a), 48 Stat. at 885; see also The Investors Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
104. See, e.g., Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 131 (Mich. 1890) (“It is
undoubtedly true that the ultimate object for which every corporation of the character of the one
under consideration is formed, is the payment of dividends to its individual members.”).
105. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (quoting VICTOR
MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 447 (2d ed. 1886),
available at http://ia600400.us.archive.org/0/items/cu31924019224603/cu31924019224603.pdf).
106. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 177; see also 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 8:16, at 8-79 to -80
(rev. 3d ed. 2011) (noting that many early statutory requirements were aimed to benefit creditors).
107. Hunter, 47 N.W. at 133–34 (discussing a Michigan state statute stating that “if the
directors of any such corporation shall declare or pay a dividend when the corporation is
insolvent, or any dividend the payment of which would render it insolvent, knowing such
corporation to be insolvent, or that the payment of such dividend would render it so, the directors
assenting thereto shall be jointly and severally liable, in an action founded on this statute, for all
debts due from such corporation at the time of paying or declaring such dividend”); see also 29
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Liability of a Director to a Corporation for Mismanagement § 6
(1995 & Supp. 2011) (discussing prohibitions on corporate waste).
108. 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 4.4 (2d ed. 1995).
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significantly higher in amount109 and were viewed as a device to protect
creditors’ interests by assuring them that a minimum amount of capital was
available.110 Third, courts were ready to invoke the ultra vires doctrine111 to
protect creditors by finding that corporations acted outside the scope of
authority, under the belief that corporations must abide by their narrowly
approved objectives.112
Another practice in measuring profit was for contracting parties to define
profit by mutual agreement to determine how much capital was available to the
shareholders for an eventual distribution.113 For example, in Park v. Grant
Locomotive Works, the plaintiff-shareholders brought a suit to compel a larger
dividend than the one the directors were prepared to issue.114 At the time the
The
lawsuit was filed, the defendant-corporation was insolvent.115
corporation’s shareholders and creditors had entered into an agreement to
recapitalize the insolvent corporation intending to restore the corporation to its
business function.116 The agreement provided for the cancellation of
mortgages to strip the corporation of encumbrances and pay the corporation’s
debt to creditors in stock.117 The terms of the agreement also provided that “all
the net profits of the company, after the payment of taxes, insurance, and the
necessary amount for the proper maintenance of the property of the company
in its present condition and capacity, shall be divided annually among the
stockholders.”118 The newly reconstituted group of shareholders then sued for
a larger dividend than that which had been announced and claimed that
approximately $205,000 remained to be distributed.119
As the court examined the shareholders’ claim to make a determination of
net profit, it identified two alternatives.120 It recognized that when a contract
controls the matter, the terms of the contract should operate as a limitation on
the directors’ discretion and thereby control the disposition of the matter.121
109. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 106, § 8.16, at 8-80.
110. Id.
111. 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1733 (2004) (“Corporate acts . . . which are outside
the scope of the general express and implied authority of the corporation are said to take ultra
vires.” (footnote omitted)).
112. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1302 (2001) (noting the importance of the ultra vires doctrine in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
113. Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 3 A. 162, 164–65 (N.J. Ch. 1885).
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 163, 166.
120. Id. at 165–66.
121. Id.
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However, “[i]n cases where the power of the directors of the corporation is
without limitation and free from restraint, they are at liberty to exercise a very
liberal discretion as to what disposition shall be made of the gains of . . . the
corporation.”122 The court’s observation was significant because it confirmed
that the determination of profit, if not fixed by contract, was within the
reasonable discretion of the board of directors.123
The innovation of a standard measure of accounting, namely, generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), did not exist when cases like Park
and Dodge were decided.124 Arguably, GAAP facilitates the measurement of
profits, which thereby enables companies to report profitability results to its
shareholders.125 Before GAAP, no clear uniform standard of measuring
income, expense, or profitability existed.126 Although there was a sense as to
what constituted profits, as these cases demonstrate, no clear consensus existed
as to the various methods of accounting to be used when determining profit.127
The determination of profit has not been an easy task. An early tax treatise
describes the challenges faced by individuals when determining profit because
“profit” was not comprehensively defined.128 For example, uncertainty existed
when recording and reporting asset appreciation and asset depreciation—two
financial events that affect the determination of profit.129
Even classical economists could not agree on the definition of profit. Adam
Smith, for example, focused on the productivity of labor when he defined
profit as payment for a combination of an entrepreneur’s risks and services.130
Others described profit as income in the form of return to the entrepreneur.131
Surprisingly, the clearest articulation of profit comes not from within the
disciplines of economics or accounting, but from the legal community. Judge
Richard Posner states that “profits, are not facts, but rather are the conclusions

122. Id. at 165.
123. See id.
124. See EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 239–40; see also Facts About FASB, FIN. ACCT.
STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission (last visited Feb. 13, 2012)
(stating that the Financial Accounting Standards Board was created in 1973 and tasked with
setting standards of accounting in the private sector, including establishing the GAAP in the
United States).
125. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 53–58, 81.
126. See id. at 33–73.
127. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 239.
128. THOMAS GOLD FROST, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW OF 1913, at 14
(1913).
129. Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he word ‘profit’ ordinarily means the excess of returns over
expenditures and may or may not, according to circumstances, include in the returns any increase
in value of the capital and in the expenditures any depreciation of capital.”).
130. Foreman, supra note 81, at 115; see also ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 156
(Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1981).
131. See ALVIN SAUNDERS JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 238 (1909).
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of a reasoning process that is based on the rationale for the rule and that as a
result turns the rule into an implicit standard.”132
B. Financial Theory Comes of Age
Modern financial theory progressed from a simple three-factor economic
analysis of wages, profits, and rent133 into a complex, multi-variable economic
analysis that utilizes differential equations to determine profitability.134 This
shift ultimately affects how shareholders evaluate corporations and their
directors.
The post-World War II environment prompted a robust period of economic
growth.135 As a result of the increased economic activity, corporations grew in
number and economic strength.136 An explosion of economic theories sought
to explain the sudden development of the American economy.137 During the
last half of the twentieth century, “prodigious empirical and theoretical
research and commentary has provided an economic perspective on the
operation of capital markets.”138
The new economic theories included highly evolved economic concepts
describing, for example, how shareholders value stock prices,139 how market
participants behave,140 and how costs are to be measured.141 These new
theories influenced corporate behavior.142 They also influenced how courts
analyzed corporate decisions. For example, in 1970, a paper by Professor
Eugene Fama hypothesized that stock prices that incorporate publicly available
information influence how market participants respond to public

132. MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
133. Arthur T. Hadley, Interest and Profits, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 337,
337 (1893).
134. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
135. The Economy: “We Are All Keynesians Now,” TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 64, 64.
136. Marty Harris & Ken Szeflinski, Celebrating Ninety Years of SOI: Selected Corporate
Data, 1916-2004, STAT. INCOME BULL. 279, 284–85 (2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07cobulhis.pdf.
137. See infra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
138. Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 373 (1984).
139. See infra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Jeffery S. Glasser, Capital Asset
Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 BUS. L. 687, 689
(1995). (“Financial economic theory is extremely instructive in uncovering the various
components of a security’s valuation, one component of which is risk. The greater the risk, the
less valuable the security; the lower the risk, the more valuable the security.”).
140. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
141. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
142. See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 927, 933 (2007) (observing the influence of accounting on corporate behavior and
examining the underlying reasons).
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information.143 This theory came to be known as the efficient capital market
hypothesis (ECMH).144 The ECMH directly influenced the Supreme Court’s
decision eighteen years later when, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, it reasoned that
“[r]ecent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the
market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information.”145 The ECMH quickly gained popularity as courts and
markets accepted research indicating its accurate representation of the impact
of public information in stock prices.146
Another influential financial device is the capital-asset pricing model
(CAPM).147 Financial experts use the CAPM to determine a company’s cost of
capital.148 A higher cost of capital negatively affects profits.149 The CAPM
attempts to identify a risk-free rate for money and a risk premium that would
be demanded for investment in the particular enterprise at issue.150 Courts
have acknowledged the validity and importance of the CAPM theory.151 For
example, the court in Cede & Co. noted that the CAPM approach is a
“technique[] or method[] . . . generally considered acceptable . . . in the
financial community.”152
Additional financial innovations include the Black-Scholes model and
present-value analysis. The Black-Scholes model is widely used to value stock
143. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
144. See Carol R. Goforth, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis—An Inadequate
Justification for the Fraud-On-The-Market Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895, 895 n.6
(1992) (describing the basis for ECMH theory).
145. 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). The Supreme Court recognized that “‘[o]f all recent
developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market hypothesis (‘ECMH’) has
achieved the widest acceptance by the legal culture.’” Id. at 253 n.4 (quoting Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 (1984)).
146. Dennis, supra note 138, at 374–75.
147. Glasser, supra note 139, at 690–92.
148. Douglas O. Edwards, (Systemic) Risk and Taxation, 31 VA. TAX. REV. 331, 354 (2011);
see also Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial Theory and Transfer Pricing,
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 666–67 (2002).
149. See Pamela Peterson Drake, The Cost of Capital 1 (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://educ.jmu.edu/~drakepp/principles/module7/coc.pdf (indicating that the lower the risk of
producing income, the lower a corporation’s cost of capital will be).
150. See Ackerman & Chorvat, supra note 148, at 666–68; see also Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *28 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“[The CAPM]
model estimates the cost of company debt (on an after tax basis for a company expected to be
able to utilize the tax deductibility of interest payments) by estimating the expected future cost of
borrowing; it estimates the future cost of equity through a multi-factor equation and then
proportionately weighs and combines the cost of equity and cost of debt to determine a cost of
capital.”).
151. See, e.g., In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 492 (Del. Ch. 1991)
(confirming the use of the CAPM method for determining the cost of capital).
152. Cede & Co., 1990 WL 161084, at *28 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
713 (Del. 1983)); see, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 349, 368 (1986).
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options.153 Present-value analysis measures “the time value of money”154 and
is used by corporate management to place a current value on a stream of future
payments.155 Present-value analysis figured prominently during the last half of
the twentieth century as companies increasingly analyzed cash flows and
liabilities on a present-value basis.156
These financial theories did not go unnoticed by the corporate community,
lawyers, or regulators. Regulatory filings with the SEC routinely included
reference to these financial theories.157 Moreover, corporations repeatedly cite
to these theories in their communications to shareholders and the public.158
At the same time that financial theory was growing in sophistication,
accounting theory also began to evolve by moving away from historical cost
accounting toward fair-value accounting.159 Fair-value accounting is the
153. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 38 n.8 (Del. 2006). In In re Walt
Disney Co., a compensation consultant applied the Black-Scholes model to assess the
reasonableness of the executive stock option. Id.
154. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 454.
155. See id. at 454–55. One of the earliest judicial applications of the present-value concept
is found in In re Jamieson’s Estate, 15 Pa. D. 618 (Pa. Orphan’s Ct. 1905). The court defined the
present value of an annuity as “such a sum that, if invested and put at interest, it will, with a
proportionate part taken from the fund yearly to make out the annuity, yield the required amount
of it annually, the whole fund being exhausted during the expectancy of life of the annuitant.” Id.
at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted). A Texas state appellate court likened present value to
“reverse interest” and explained that “[a] present value discount is, as it were, reverse-interest: it
subtracts from the sum of payments to be received in the future the interest that would be earned
on that sum if it were paid in full at present and held until each payment came due.” Lau Family
P’ship v. Nirtag U.S., Inc., No. 08-01-00022-cv, 2002 WL 997741, at *3 (Tex. App. May 16,
2002) (quoting PRC Kentron, Inc. v. First City Ctr. Assocs., II, 762 S.W.2d 279, 290 n.11 (Tex.
App. 1988)). The court added that “if the interest rate and the present value discount rate are the
same, the present value of a series of periodic payments—past payments with interest and future
payments discounted—is the same at any point during the entire period.” Id. (quoting PRC
Kentron, Inc., 762 S.W.2d at 290 n.11).
156. See Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1992).
157. See, e.g., AT&T INC., FORM 10-K 72 (2010), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=113088&p=irol-SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2lyLmludC53ZXN0bGF3YnVzaW5lc3MuY29tL2RvY3VtZW50L3YxLzAwMDA3MzI3MTctMTEtMDAwMDE0L3htb
A%3d%3d (referencing the Black-Scholes theory); COCA-COLA CO., UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FORM 10-K 48, 124 (2010), available at
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2010.pdf
(mentioning
the
present-value and Black-Scholes methodologies);.
158. FORD MOTOR CO., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2010), available at
http://corporate.ford.com/doc/ir_2010_annual_report.pdf. (mentioning Black-Scholes and
present-value concepts); KELLOGG CO., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (2010), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/K/1523434307x0x448599/a9b46c48-9b3b-41d4-9350-e902636df788/kelloggs_2010_ar.pdf (same).
159. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting, The Emergence of Fair
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (1996)
(observing the shift from cost accounting to fair-value accounting in the twentieth century). Cost
accounting refers to the method of accounting “[w]hen market prices are unavailable, [and] a
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process of reporting the hypothetical fair market value of an asset or liability,
as well as hypothetical gains and losses.160 Proponents of fair-value
accounting argue that this approach “provide[s] investors (and to a lesser
extent business and policy makers) with accurate and clear information on a
company’s net assets and operating performance.”161 Critics, however, argue
that fair-value accounting is subjective and provides management with an
incentive to engage in gains trading activities.162 Fair-value accounting also
provides corporate management with the justification to use an array of value
ranges that ultimately affect the profitability of a corporation.163 For example,
a management decision to categorize a security as a held-to-maturity security
instead of a trading security affects whether the corporation records additional
income or loss.164 The choice of available accounting methods is not new.
What is new, however, is the change in philosophy from the historical cost
basis of accounting to the malleable fair-value basis of accounting.165
One must be mindful of the subtle, yet significant shift in determining
profitability, a shift whereby the notion of profit expanded over time. In
pre-industrial organizations, the owner was also the manager of the business
and therefore knew with a high degree of certainty the financial welfare of the
business enterprise.166 However, the corporate form, which allowed for
separation of ownership from management,167 gained popularity, and the
notion of profit expanded to include more variables, such as opportunity
costs.168 As the twentieth century drew to a close, the concept of profit
continued to expand to include hypothetical gains and losses in the form of

company values the investment and reports it at cost in periods subsequent to
acquisition . . . . Companies recognize dividends when received. They value the portfolio and
report it at acquisition cost. Companies only recognize gains or losses after selling the
securities.” DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 848 n.7 (12th ed. 2007).
160. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE: FAIR VALUE
MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820): AMENDMENTS TO ACHIEVE COMMON FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT
AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN U.S. GAAP AND IFRSS 10 (2011), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blob
where=1175822486936&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
(“[F]air
value
measurement
[attempts] . . . to estimate the price at which an orderly transaction to sell the asset or to transfer
the liability would take place between market participants at the measurement date under current
market conditions . . . .”); see also Summary of Statement No. 157, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS
BOARD, http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsum157.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
161. PETER M. FASS ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK § 3:87 (2011).
162. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 860–61.
163. Id. at 839.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. EDWARDS, supra note 84, at 77.
167. See GEVURTZ, supra note 38, at 4.
168. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 931 (defining opportunity cost as “the benefit that
could have been obtained by pursuing an alternative course of action”).
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fair-value accounting.169 Every period of economic progress seems to bring
with it an expansion in the notion of profit.170 As the notion of profit has
expanded, investors, seeking to exploit profit opportunities, have persuaded
legislators to adopt hybrid entities such as limited-liability partnerships
(LLPs),171 limited-liability companies (LLCs),172 and limited-liability limited
partnerships (LLLPs),173 which offer a narrow scope of liability and thereby
widen the gap of responsibility.174
III. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES IN PROVIDING
ADEQUATE PUBLIC PROTECTIONS OR CORPORATE INCENTIVES
It is fair to ask why another structure regulating corporate behavior is
necessary if there are already laws in place. Law, as a social institution for
regulating behavior, is imperfect.175 Because of the value society places on
policies like freedom to contract,176 freedom from undue restraint,177 and free
will,178 imperfections in the social institution of the law are inevitable.
If the goal of the law is to provide justice, equity, and efficiency, then this
goal is compromised in certain contexts when one considers that individual

169. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. A gnawing question to consider: “If
accounting theory, even after much academic and professional debate, boils down to management
discretion among competing accounting principles, how much confidence can regulators or the
public have in any financial reporting system?”
170. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1989).
171. An LLP is defined as a “partnership in which a partner is not liable for a negligent act
committed by another partner or by an employee not under the partner’s supervision.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 1230.
172. An LLC is defined as “[a] company—statutorily authorized in certain states—that is
characterized by limited liability, management by members or managers, and limitations on
ownership transfer.” Id. at 319.
173. See Carter G. Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Registered Limited Liability Limited
Partnerships, in LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW CURRENT THROUGH
2011, ¶ 15.03[4][a] (2011) (describing the benefits of LLLP status).
174. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using Comparative and Transnational Law to Teach
Corporate Social Responsibility, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 39, 49–51
(2011) (examining LLCs and concerns about CSR in the context of multinational businesses).
175. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (2007) (“[C]ontract law, like all
social institutions, does not work perfectly . . . .”).
176. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 720 (2011) (defining “freedom of contract” to mean
the freedom “to make whatever contracts they please as long as the contracts are legal in all
respects and not contrary to public policy, and as long as no fraud or deception is practiced”).
177. Id.
178. See Charles Dougherty, Note, Who Needs Contract Law?—A Critical Look at
Contractual Indemnification (or Lack Thereof) in FHAA and ADA “Design and Construct”
Cases, 44 IND. L. REV. 545, 545 (2011) (observing the link between free will and the freedom of
contract).
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plaintiffs are subjected to enhanced procedural requirements.179 These
enhanced requirements have made it increasingly difficult for legitimate
plaintiffs to proceed against corporate defendants.180
Corporations have successfully defended many cases in which serious injury
or death occurred.181 Several reasons account for this phenomenon. First,
corporate defendants have structural devices in the forms of statutes and legal
precedent that provide them with an initial legal barrier.182 Second, corporate
defendants have an enormous financial advantage over plaintiffs, which
enables a corporate defendant to deploy considerable legal resources to stave
off a plaintiff’s legal threats.183 Third, as times passes, individual plaintiffs
become personally invested in the outcome of litigation from a psychological,
emotional, and financial perspective, whereas corporate defendants can remain
detached from the proceedings and dispassionately concern themselves solely
with the financial implications of an adverse judgment.184
A. The Role of Tort Law in CSR
Torts cause harm to victims and society by diminishing the victim’s quality
of life and increasing suffering.185 Correspondingly, tort law serves as a tool to
fill the public-responsibility gap left by private ordering and government

179. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (aiming to curb
abusive litigation in securities class-action cases by increasing procedural requirements); see also
Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During
the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2006) (surveying the ways
in which the PSLRA attempts “to target the perceived abuse by plaintiffs’ lawyers in class action
securities litigation”).
180. See Amy L. Craiger, Note, From Conceivable to Impossible: The Hurdles Plaintiffs
Must Overcome When Pleading Section 11 and Section 12(A) Securities Claims, 5 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 549, 549–51 (2011) (emphasizing the difficulties faced by plaintiffs trying
to bring legitimate claims in the face of strict procedural requirements).
181. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d
Cir. 1987).
182. Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v. Dunsmore, 60 N.H. 85, 86 (1880) (discussing the
broad authority held by corporate directors and noting that “[t]he only limitation upon the
judgment or discretion of the directors is such as the corporation by its by-laws and votes shall
impose”).
183. See Richard B. Bernstein, Mapping Legal History’s “Middle Ground,” 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675, 685–86 (1991) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992)) (discussing a
corporate defendant’s significant resources as compared to an individual plaintiff’s).
184. See id.; cf. Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money”: A Theory on Misconceptions of
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 721–22 (2007) (noting that plaintiffs’
extra-legal objectives for litigation, such as “dignity and respect after the injury, [the] inability to
be heard, refusal to listen, dismissal and victim blaming,” did not decrease over time).
185. David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 716 (1992).
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regulation.186 It addresses the conduct of actors engaging in public behavior by
deterring unreasonable conduct and compensating injured parties.187
Tort law is designed to influence two distinct classes of behavior: impulsive
Impulsive conduct is sudden and
conduct and deliberate conduct.188
unexpected, and the actor does not think before reacting,189 whereas deliberate
conduct is such that the actor contemplated the harm, although it was not
necessarily intended.190
Government action can influence deliberate behavior. For example,
government regulations requiring passenger air bags or seat belts ultimately
forced the automobile industry to act.191 Without clear regulations and
enforcement, corporations are reluctant to implement safety measures
voluntarily because of the added cost;192 thus, manufacturers are faced with a
Hobson’s choice: does the manufacturer absorb the cost or should the
manufacturer pass the cost onto the consumer? Manufacturers are sensitive to
price increases because they generally translate into either lower profit margins
for manufacturers, if manufacturers absorb the cost, or higher consumer prices
if manufacturers pass on the cost.193 In any event, manufacturers are acutely
sensitive to costs because they directly affect a firm’s profits and may create a
competitive hindrance in price-sensitive markets.194 The reality of this
decision-making process must not be lost on policymakers.

186. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that tort law imposes liability on “socially unreasonable” conduct).
187. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
115, 118 (1993).
188. Id. at 127–28.
189. Id. at 128.
190. Id.
191. See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240,
§ 2508, 105 Stat. 1914, 2805 (codified in scattered sections of 23 and 49 U.S.C.); Safety Belt
Child
Restraint
Laws,
INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
(Apr.
2012),
http://www.iihs.org/laws/safetybeltuse.aspx (noting that forty-nine states have laws requiring seat
belts).
192. See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of
Mexico . . . And the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 391, 400–01 (2011) (detailing the efforts of BP to “systematically cut back on critical safety
measures” in order to cut costs before the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
193. See, e.g., Business and Commodity Prices: Everyday Higher Prices, ECONOMIST, Feb.
26, 2011, at 68, 68 (describing manufacturers’ decisions to pass on costs to consumers and the
subsequent effects on business).
194. See CHARTERED INST. PERSONNEL & DEV., SUSTAINABLE ORGANISATION
PERFORMANCE: WHAT REALLY MAKES THE DIFFERENCE? 19, 29 (2011), available at
http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/69BF5AEA-7240-4F51-A437-BC165AA9B03E/0/Sustainable_organisation_performance_STF_interim_report.pdf (highlighting management’s cognizance
of the pressure to reduce costs while also maintaining quality and safety).
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Plaintiffs seeking to impose tort liability must prove each element of the
claim.195 This is consistent with the American system of justice, which
generally places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.196 However, plaintiffs
with both nominal and costly claims may find barriers to pursuing their cases.
Litigation expenses can easily run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars,
and attorney and expert-witness fees may make such a case cost-prohibitive for
some plaintiffs.197 Plaintiffs with nominal claims also face challenges because
plaintiffs’ lawyers tend not to take cases in which possible recovery is under
$50,000.198 Such barriers to obtaining representation are akin to a de facto
denial of protection for many potential plaintiffs who have suffered harm but
are left with an unanswered injury.199
Moreover, pursuing a tort theory, even in the face of sympathetic facts, is
not necessarily a fait accompli.200 For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., the plaintiff purchased a car for his wife as a gift.201 Shortly
thereafter, his wife was injured while driving when the car suddenly swerved
into a wall.202 The record indicates that the car had experienced no problem
and she was driving the car at a moderate speed when she heard a loud noise
and lost control of the car.203 Testimony from a bus operator who witnessed
the accident confirmed that the car suddenly “veered at 90 degrees . . . and

195. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 2 (2011).
196. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
197. David M. Scott, Note, Non-Traditional Resolutions to Mass Tort Disputes Take a Hit as
AIDS-Infected Hemophiliacs Bear the Cost of Judge Posner’s “Economic Justice,” 12 OHIO ST.
J. DISP. RESOL. 159, 168–69 (1996). One study calculated that in 2007, tort costs in the
United States were $853 per capita and the total cost was $252 billion. TOWERS PERRIN,
2008
UPDATE
ON
U.S.
TORT
COST
TRENDS
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/200811/2008_tort_costs_tren
ds.pdf.
198. Shuman, supra note 187, at 120 (citing Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147,
1190–91 (1992)). It is suggested that smaller claims in products liability and medical malpractice
are usually not compensated by the legal system. Id. Usually, tort claims will be filed when the
plaintiff has sustained serious injury as a result of a solvent defendant’s unsafe behavior. Id.
199. See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access in Legal Representation: The Attack on the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 33, 35 (2000) (observing the
inadequate amount of legal representation available to individuals in need of legal counsel);
Shuman, supra note 189, at 119–20.
200. See Shuman, supra note 187, at 119–20 (stating that plaintiffs suffering minor tortious
injuries may be “uncertain, ex ante, whether tortious behavior will result in a claim that triggers
the deterrent function of tort law” given the perception that only conduct judged to require
deterrence will permit eventual recovery).
201. 161 A.2d 69, 73 (N.J. 1960).
202. Id. at 75.
203. Id.
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right into [a] wall.”204 The insurance adjuster opined that the accident “must
have been due to mechanical defect or failure.”205
The Henningsens sued Chrysler Corporation based on tort and contract
claims.206 Despite the evidence supporting their negligence claims, the trial
court dismissed the negligence counts by reasoning that “the proof was not
sufficient to make out a prima facie case as to the negligence of either the
manufacturer or the dealer.”207 Henningsen illustrates the challenges faced by
plaintiffs when pursuing tort actions.
Because courts seek to balance equity and efficiency when examining tort
cases,208 the question inevitably arises, how should courts strike this balance
while evaluating the relative risks and hardships faced by tort litigants? Judge
Learned Hand famously provided an answer in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.209 The fundamental issue in this case centered on how far a
defendant’s duty to act and to prevent harm to others extends: is there an
absolute duty to act always or is the duty relative and dependent on the
circumstances?210 Judge Hand reasoned that
[s]ince there are occasions when every vessel will break from her
moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those
about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions.211
Thus, Judge Hand adopted a relative duty of care by balancing the parties’
interests and taking into account varying circumstances, risks, and costs.212

204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 73.
207. Id. at 75. The plaintiffs nonetheless prevailed at the trial-court level on their breach of
warranty claims. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision on those grounds and
thus declined to express an opinion on the negligence claim. Id. at 102.
208. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 11
(2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4641/10-22tortreform-study.pdf.
209. 159 F.2d 169, 170–71 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll, when the defendant failed to take
adequate precautions to safeguard and secure an unmanned barge, the barge broke free from its
moorings and damaged other ships before sinking and losing its cargo. Id. at 171. The barge
owner, as plaintiff, argued that the harbor master had the authority to determine the sufficiency of
the strength of the lines attaching the barge to the pier. Id. The defendant countered by arguing
that the barge owner was negligent because he failed to leave a person on board the barge. Id.
210. See id. at 173.
211. Id. Judge Hand famously articulated his theory as a formula, analyzing whether burden
(B) was less than injury (L) multiplied by probability (P). Id.
212. Id.
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Rationalizing costs and expenses was not a new phenomenon when the
Second Circuit decided Carroll in 1947.213 Indeed, a new theory of accounting
called cost accounting—“used for measurement of cost, assignment of cost to
cost accounting periods, or allocation of cost to cost objectives”214—was
beginning to gain acceptance in commercial circles.215 As manufacturing
businesses expanded in size and complexity, simple accounting methods no
longer sufficed to capture, measure, and account for direct and indirect costs
adequately.216 Cost accounting influenced the overall development of
accounting theory, which led to improved measurement of profits.217 Other
cost accounting developments included the break-even analysis, which
emerged in the 1950s, and the “cost-volume-profit” (CVP) analysis, which
emerged in the mid-1960s.218 CVP analyzes “how costs and profits behave in
response to changes in the level of business activity”219 and can help corporate
management in determining the necessary amount of sales needed to reach a
targeted income level, the margin of safety before an operating loss is incurred,
and any anticipated income variation, among others.220 Due to the benefits of
these innovations, corporate managers and shareholders alike would never look
at costs the same way again and embraced cost accounting as a tool to control
costs and maximize profits.221
Despite the benefits of cost accounting, nowhere did the impact of cost
accounting have such a garish application than in the Ford Pinto case.222 The
Ford Motor Company began developing the Ford Pinto in 1968 to compete in
the emerging subcompact automobile market.223 As a result of Ford’s goal to
produce a light car at a low cost, Ford sacrificed engineering for style.224

213. Janet A. Hume-Schwarz, Cost-Accounting: A Historical Perspective, 12 PROC. ACAD.
ACCT. & FIN. STUD. 53, 53–55 (2007), available at http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/allied
/2007-reno/Accounting%20and%20Financial%20Studies/15.pdf.
214. Perry v. Martin Marietta Corp., 47 F.3d 1134, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting 4. C.F.R.
§ 331.20(k) (1992)).
215. Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 57.
216. Id. at 54–55.
217. HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 42 (noting that improved accounting methods among
growing industrial firms meant that “[i]nventory valuations became more firmly rooted in the cost
principle, and a better matching of revenues and expenses resulted”).
218. Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 57.
219. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at 890.
220. See id.
221. See Hume-Schwarz, supra note 213, at 54, 58.
222. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Martin
A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 63, 103 (1988).
223. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359–60.
224. Id. at 360.

676

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:651

During the testing phase of the Pinto, crash-test data indicated that rear-end
damage threatened the fuel system’s integrity.225 Ford could have easily and
inexpensively fixed the deficiency, but it chose not to do so.226 Ford produced
326,867 Pintos in the first year of production alone.227 Consumers reported
numerous accidents involving exploding gas tanks in rear-end collisions.228
Only after hundreds of people lost their lives or were seriously injured229 did
Ford act by spending “at least 20 million dollars to recall the 1971-1976
Pintos.”230
Ford’s macabre calculus in its decision to sell unsafe cars balanced the value
of a human life against corporate profits.231 Specifically, it balanced $137
million, the cost to correct the defect, against $49.5 million, the cost to defend
lawsuits.232 Even though Ford could have remedied the hazardous fuel-tank
design at minimal cost, it “decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against
corporate profits. Ford’s institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous
indifference to public safety.”233
Ford Motors Company is by no means the only car company with
manufacturing problems. In 2009, reports alleged that the gas pedals on
Toyota and Lexus models were sticking, which caused acceleration
problems.234 Toyota initially denied any problems with its pedals;235 however,
an internal document surfaced in which the company stated that it saved $100
million by delaying corrective action.236 Toyota Motors faced allegations that
these defects resulted in multiple injuries and deaths.237 The National
225. Id.
226. Id. at 360–61.
227. OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
INVESTIGATION REPORT, PHASE I: ALLEGED FUEL TANK AND FILLER NECK DAMAGE IN
REAR-END COLLISION OF SUBCOMPACT PASSENGER CARS (1978), reprinted in THE FORD PINTO
CASE: A STUDY IN APPLIED ETHICS, BUSINESS, AND TECHNOLOGY 77, 83 (Douglas Birsch &
John H. Fielder eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE FORD PINTO CASE]. By 1976, Ford had produced a
total of 2,213,700 Pintos. Id.
228. See MARK DOWIE, PINTO MADNESS (1977), reprinted in THE FORD PINTO CASE, supra
note 227, at 15, 16.
229. See Douglas Birsch, Product Safety, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Ford Pinto Case, in
THE FORD PINTO CASE, supra note 227, at 147, 160.
230. DOWIE, supra note 228, at 16.
231. Id. at 35.
232. Id. at 28.
233. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (Ct. App. 1981).
234. See Ralph Vartabedian & Ken Bensinger, Toyota’s Woes May Not End at Floor Mats,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at A1.
235. Ken Bensinger & Ralph Vartabedian, Toyota Is Publicly Rebuked on Defect, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A1.
236. See infra Exhibit 2.
237. Ken Bensinger & Ralph Vartabedian, Toyota to Fix ‘Dangerous’ Pedal Defect, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1 (“A review of consumer complaints to the National Highway Traffic
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Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) launched an investigation
into the defective gas-pedal design,238 which ruled out electrical malfunction
and operator error, but found mechanical defects in the form of “pedal
entrapment” and “sticky pedal.”239 As a penalty for failing to report the
defective gas pedals to NHTSA in a timely manner, the agency ultimately
imposed a $16.375 million civil penalty on Toyota.240
The Ford and Toyota cases illustrate why tort law is concerned with
“socially unreasonable conduct.”241 By implication, tort law tolerates losses
and will adjust for these losses through a system of damages awarded by
law.242 As a matter of policy, tort law tolerates, and even expects, that a
certain degree of injury will be placed on the public.243
Like any actor, corporations attempt to balance costs against benefits before
taking action.244 Corrective action, too, has a cost, which must be weighed
against any benefits as an integral part of any business decision.245
Manufacturers of goods, in particular, constantly face the possibility of design
flaws in their race to beat competitors to the marketplace.246
How, then, should corporations act in the absence of positive law? How
should a corporation act when corporate-law principles require it to maximize
profitability? Or, how should a corporation act when corporate-law principles

Safety Administration shows at least 1,000 incidents of unintended acceleration in Toyota
vehicles in the last eight years, along with scores of accidents and injuries as well as untold
property damage.”). Toyota ultimately recalled seven Toyota and Lexus models with the alleged
defect. Id.
238. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRONIC THROTTLE CONTROL (ETC) SYSTEMS, at vi (2011),
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NHTSA_report_execsum.pdf.
239. Id. at vii, ix (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. U.S. Department of Transportation Releases Results from NHTSA-NASA Study of
Unintended
Acceleration
in
Toyota
Vehicles,
NHTSA
(Feb.
8,
2011),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-16-11 (providing a complete timeline of events); see also Ken
Thomas & Tomoko A. Hosaka, Toyota Recall: Automaker Pays Record Fine over Acceleration
(Dec.
21,
2010,
7:10 AM),
available
at
Problems,
HUFFINGTON POST
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/21/toyota-recall-automaker-p_0_n_799549.html (stating
that in addition to the fine levied by NHTSA, Toyota agreed to pay a $32.4 million fine to the
U.S. government for its handling of safety recalls).
241. KEETON ET AL., supra note 186, at 6.
242. Id. (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238,
238 (1944)).
243. Id. at 24.
244. See Paul R. Portney, Benefit-Cost Analysis, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 38.
245. See supra notes 226, 231–34 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Top 10 Product Recalls, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages
/article/0,28804,1908719_1908717_1974910,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); see supra notes
222–26 and accompanying text.
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insulate directors from ordinary breaches of due care?247 In the absence of
positive law, which establishes either a duty to act or an incentive to act, tort
law encourages firms to weigh responsibility by balancing the probability and
gravity of the injury against the burdens of action.248 The state of our current
jurisprudence provides corporations with a powerful incentive not to balance in
favor of responsibility.249
Admittedly, it is unlikely that any corporate enterprise will ever again
balance away corrective action against human life as Ford Motors did in the
case of the Ford Pinto. However, no one can predict with reasonable certainty
what temptations profit pressures will bring to bear on a corporation. What is
certain is that the modern corporation can now affect an indeterminate number
of individuals throughout the world within a relatively brief time frame.250 The
cry for responsible profitability will echo from all corners of the globe.
B. The Role of Contract Law in CSR
Contract law is ineffective as an instrument to encourage CSR because it is
premised upon a consensual relationship between two or more parties who
bargain for a specified performance.251 In contrast, CSR initiatives seek to
impose a duty on a corporate actor without the corporation’s consent.252 The

247. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011) (permitting corporations to
include in their certificates of incorporation “[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for breaches of fiduciary duty,” but
requiring that directors must remain liable for breaches of the duties of loyalty and good faith, and
for any improperly derived personal benefits).
248. See Christopher M.F. Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit
System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1057–58 (1984) (noting that
firms “should avoid accidents only so long as the cost of avoiding accidents is less than the cost
of allowing them to occur”).
249. Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate
Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1361,
1393–94 (1993).
250. For instance, Ford Motor Company sells its economy-priced Ford Focus in 122
countries.
Global Focus—Ford’s New C-Segment Product Family Poised to Achieve
Unprecedented Scale, FORD.MEDIA.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), http://media.ford.com/article
_display.cfm?article_id=31767. Coca-Cola Enterprises sells its product through a system of local
bottlers in over 200 markets. Our Company, COCA-COLA COMPANY, http://www.thecocacolacompany.com/ourcompany/index.html (last visited on Nov. 30, 2011). The online market for
prescription drugs also allows firms to facilitate a sale to anyone with computer access, anywhere
commercial deliveries are available. See Michael OReilly, Get Ready for Online Sales of
Prescription Drugs, 161 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 557, 557 (1999).
251. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1:1 (6th ed. 2009); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty.”).
252. See Kim Kercher, Corporate Social Responsibility: Impact of Globalization and
GOVERNANCE
E-J.,
at
5
(Apr.
2007),
International
Business,
CORP.
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objective of any CSR initiative is to broaden the corporate actor’s scope of
duty beyond the traditional norms of contract law.253 Thus, the finding of a
positive duty is paramount to any theory of CSR.254
At times, the line between contract-law duty and tort-law duty may blur, as
both doctrines rely on a duty for a finding of responsibility and liability.255
However, important doctrinal differences exist between the two.256 Contract
law is premised on the notion of private ordering between the parties.257
Unlike tort liability, which stems from socially unacceptable conduct,258
liability in contract is premised on the occurrence of a breach by one of the
parties following a voluntary bargaining process.259 In contrast, tort law seeks
to regulate public conduct.260 Liability in tort is premised upon the breach of a
duty to act in a socially acceptable manner.261
At the root of contract law lies one of the most fundamental legal
principles: the freedom to contract.262 This doctrine holds that contracting
parties are free to define the scope of their rights and duties governing their
relationship, provided that the agreement is not otherwise illegal or contrary to
public policy.263 Courts zealously guard the principle of freedom of

http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgej/4 (discussing the debate on whether to impose CSR
requirements on corporations).
253. Id. at 2–3.
254. See id. at 6 (noting the inability to hold corporations “accountable in the absence of
prescriptive legislation”).
255. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 669
(1989) (observing the overlap between contract- and tort-law doctrines).
256. See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 623,
626–27 (1991) (noting several important distinctions between contract and tort law).
257. Id.
258. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
259. 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 63:8 (4th ed. 2002). When breach of a promise occurs, it is necessary to evaluate
whether the breach is material because the breach would allow the plaintiff to cancel the contract
and sue for damages. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 11:18. However, the plaintiff must additionally
prove that he or she was “ready, willing and able to perform but for the breach.” Id.
260. See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 3 (2004).
261. See Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors and Officers’ Liability for Supervision
and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
1161, 1671 (2010); see also Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (M.D. Pa.
1990) (“A policy consideration underlying tort law is the protection of persons and property from
losses resulting from injury . . . .”); Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 274
(N.D. Ohio 1982) (“The purpose of much of the law of torts . . . is to deter wrongful activity as
well as to compensate victims thereof and to impose on proper party the cost of insuring against
risks of certain activity.”); Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672
(N.J. 1985) (“[T]ort law protect[s] society’s interest in freedom from harm.”).
262. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 1:3.
263. Id.
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contract,264 and once a contract is established as enforceable, courts likewise
protect the expectation interests of the bargaining parties.265 Courts are also
reluctant to bind parties to a contract when no legal relationship was
intended.266
Contract liability is based on the notion of privity of contract.267 Contract
law mandates this relationship before liability will be imposed;268 however, a
widely recognized exception to this rule is the law of third-party
beneficiaries.269 The exception provides that “‘one who is not privy to . . . [an]
agreement may demonstrate . . . that the contract was actually made for his
benefit . . . so that he becomes a third-party beneficiary and [is] eligible to
bring an action on such agreement.’”270 Courts have recognized the right of
intended beneficiaries to enforce contracts since the middle of the nineteenth
century when Judge Horace Gray stated in Lawrence v. Fox that “he for whose
benefit [a promise] is made may bring an action for its breach.”271 However,
the contract’s term must expressly indicate an intent to benefit the third party,
otherwise courts will presume that no third-party beneficiary was intended.272
Another bedrock principle of contract law is that “only parties to a contract and
any third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to enforce that
contract.”273 CSR initiatives lack the direct privity of contract or the requisite
intent to create a third-party beneficiary designee.274 As a result, courts are

264. See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1.2 (2011).
265. Id.
266. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 2:1 (“Usually, an essential prerequisite to the formation of a
contract is an agreement—a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms.” (citing Russell v.
Union Oil Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1970); Quality Sheet Metal Co. v. Woods, 627 P.2d 1128
(Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Considine, 310 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Christenson
v. Billings Livestock Comm’n, 653 P.2d 492 (Mont. 1982))).
267. Id. § 17:1; First Nat’l Bank of Windsor v. Gilbert Marshall & Co., 780 P.2d 73, 74
(Colo. App. 1989) (“Privity is that connection or relationship which exists between two or more
contracting parties.” (citing Bonfils v. McDonald, 270 P. 650 (1929))).
268. See Peter Kiewit & Sons’, Inc. v. ATSER, LP, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1137–38 (D. Neb.
2010). Contract liability may also be imposed despite the lack of a contract under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 167–68 (Mo. App.
1959); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274–75 (Wis. 1965).
269. Peter Kiewit & Sons’, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
270. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 738, 747
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990)).
271. See 20 N.Y. 268, 274 (1859).
272. Id.
273. Verni v. Cleveland Chiropractic Coll., 212 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)
(citing Andes v. Albano, 853 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Windsor Grp., Inc., 2 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Mo. App. 1999)).
274. Id.

2012]

Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet!

681

reluctant to find a duty to act for the benefit of some third-party beneficiary
when it was not expressly intended.275
Contract law also is limited as a tool of social responsibility because it is
based on freedom of contract and mutual agreement.276 Corporations, keenly
aware of these doctrines and mindful of courts’ reluctance to interfere in the
bargaining process, opportunistically exploit the contracting process. For
example, arbitration clauses,277 forum-selection clauses,278 and home-office
approval clauses279 are thrust on unwary consumers in many consumer, sales,
and financing contracts.280
Corporations exploit a procedural advantage in the contractual bargaining
process. A corporation’s dominant position allows it to exploit procedural
advantages because the bargaining process is no longer conducive to a free and
open negotiation process.281 For example, corporate field offices employ
corporate agents who have no authority to change the terms of a contract.282
Contracts may be structured such that acceptance is subject to approval at the
corporate home office, which thereby cleverly converts the customer into the
offeror.283 Similarly, structural limitations work counter to a policy of CSR.
For example, mandatory arbitration and forum-selection provisions, limitations
on the seller’s warranties, and loss allocations are designed to maximize a
corporation’s contractual rights while simultaneously minimizing its
contractual obligations.284 Contracting parties in general, and corporate parties
in particular, routinely use structural devices to limit their contractual
responsibility.285

275. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928) (declining
to allow an individual to bring a third-party-beneficiary claim against a water company that
breached its contract with a city to provide water for fire hydrants).
276. PERILLO, supra note 251, § 2:1.
277. An arbitration clause is “[a] contractual provision mandating arbitration—and thereby
avoiding litigation—of disputes about the contracting parties’ rights, duties, and liabilities.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 120.
278. A forum-selection clause is a contractual provision designating the jurisdiction in which
disputes will be litigated. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2011).
279. See Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through Reinvigorated
Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 863, 918 (1995).
280. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1153
(2008) (observing that merchants are aware of consumers’ frequent failure to read the terms of
contracts and noting that if they did, they would likely object to arbitration or forum-selection
clauses contained therein).
281. See PERILLO, supra note 251, § 1.3 (noting the decreasing role of the bargaining process
in consumer transactions).
282. Bhala, supra note 279, at 918.
283. Id.
284. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203–04 (2003).
285. See id. (noting that the majority of commercial contracts employ such devices).
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Corporations also exploit a substantive advantage in contract law through
the use of adhesion contracts.286 These contracts are the most common form of
limiting responsibility and corresponding liability.287 Although both parties
are free to enter into these contracts, the reality is that the maker of such
adhesion contracts almost always enjoys a superior bargaining position.288
Corporations have successfully used adhesion contracts to internalize
benefits and externalize costs, often with drastic and inequitable results for
society at large. For instance, courts have recognized the rights of parties to
bargain for forum-selection clauses. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., “‘(I)t is settled . . . that parties to a contract
may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit
notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice
altogether.’”289
Industry practice is another impediment for CSR initiatives. Entire
industries may have redrafted their contracts to minimize corporate liability.290
For example, the oil-shipping industry outsourced certain business operations,
such as the transportation of oil, to judgment-proof entities in order to limit
liability.291 Another example is the drafting of a contract clause to limit the
insurance industry’s exposure to certain types of policy risks.292 Consumers,
who are dispersed and unorganized, face a daunting task in overcoming the
organized and well-funded efforts of corporations and their dependent trade
organizations.
Parties have the freedom of contract to negotiate and include bargained
terms in contracts,293 as well as a duty to read their documents before
signing.294 However, the growing disparity in relative bargaining power,
286. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981) (“‘The term signifies a
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength,
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’”
(quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961))).
287. See Korobkin, supra note 284, at 1203–04; see also Richard C. Ausness, Risky
Business: Liability of Product Sellers Who Offer Safety Devices as Optional Equipment, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 807, 814 (2011) (observing that the stronger one party’s bargaining power, the
more likely it is that that party will attempt to limit its liability with an adhesion contract).
288. Graham, 623 P.2d at 171.
289. 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (quoting Nat’l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
315–16 (1964)).
290. Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organization Choice, 45 J.L. & ECON. 91, 93
(2002).
291. See id.
292. See Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The “Sudden and Accidental” Exception to the Pollution
Exclusion Clause in Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of
Environmental Liability, 45 VAND. L. REV. 161, 167 (1992) (illustrating a pollution exclusion
clause that limits insurance coverage to damage caused by “sudden and accidental” events).
293. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
294. See PERILLO, supra note 251, § 9.41. For an example, see Apple’s iTunes terms and
conditions of use, which flash on the screen and must be accepted to download the program.
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coordinated industry practices, and a body of contracts jurisprudence that
affirms the validity of adhesion contracts makes the branch of contract law
ill-equipped to embark on a CSR initiative.
C. The Role of Corporate Law in CSR
Shareholders seeking to require corporations to engage in socially
responsible corporate behavior face a daunting task. There are structural
impediments in corporate law that shareholders must overcome. The most
important structural impediment is that many state statutes require a board of
directors to oversee every corporation.295 Such provisions clearly mandate that
the decisions and judgments of the board of directors govern the “business and
affairs” of the corporation,296 despite the role of shareholders as the undisputed
owners of the corporate entity.297
Still, shareholders have attempted in earnest to influence corporate policy.
The most common method of influencing corporate policy is through the
annual election of directors.298 Corporate law enables the removal of a director
by shareholders.299 However, removing and replacing directors, while
possible, is a cumbersome and difficult task.300 Several reasons account for
this. The board of directors, and not the shareholders, controls the nominating
committee for directors.301 The board of directors routinely communicates its
recommendations for board positions to shareholders.302 Additionally, the
board of directors has access to and use of corporate funds to finance a
communication strategy to shareholders and to defeat any potential

Apple Updated iTunes Terms and Conditions, TECH. J. (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://thetechjournal.com/electronics/iphone/apple-updated-itunes-terms-and-conditions.xhtml.
295. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (2011).
296. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
297. Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee: Re-Inventing
Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 97, 100–01 (2011).
298. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg.
56,668, 56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (“A principal way that shareholders can hold boards accountable
and influence matters of corporate policy is through the nomination and election of directors.”).
299. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1250 (2004).
300. See, e.g., id. (“The power of stockholders to remove a director for cause may only be
exercised by stockholders controlling a sufficient number of votes required for action, which is at
least a majority, but which, under particular certificates of incorporation, may be a number greater
than a majority.”).
301. See Marc R. Trevino, Final SEC Proxy Access Rules, 996 PRACTISING L. INST. TAX
& EST. PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 681, 689 (2011).
302. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2007) (noting that proxy statements sent to shareholders
will indicate the board’s recommendations).
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opponent.303 Moreover, the board of directors functions as a unified group. In
contrast, shareholders are fragmented, geographically dispersed, and place
differing values on their investments in the corporation.304 Many shareholders
also lack the financial resources to mount a campaign against a corporate
director, let alone the corporate entity.305
Another device available to shareholders is the use of the shareholder
proposal.306 SEC rules permit shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion
However,
in proxy materials that are distributed to shareholders.307
shareholder proposals are subject to stringent procedural and substantive
requirements.308 SEC Rule 14a-8 sets forth the proposal procedure.309
The shareholder’s right of inclusion is not absolute and is subject to several
important limitations.310 Rule 14a-8 limits a shareholder’s proposal right by
stating that, among other bases, management may exclude a proposal if it
appears to promote a shareholder’s personal interest311 or if it is related to
ordinary business operations within the board’s purview.312 Moreover,
shareholders seeking to include shareholder proposals can expect formidable
corporate opposition313 and must be ready to mount an active and expensive
campaign if their proposals are ever to be distributed.314
The challenges that shareholders face regarding shareholder proposals is
exemplified in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, in which the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed an SEC decision to exclude a

303. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 901 (9th ed. 2008).
304. Sjostrom & Kim, supra note 302, at 467 (noting that the dispersed nature of
shareholders and that “shareholder apathy,” among other things, contribute to shareholders’
limited influence in the election process for directors).
305. See id.
306. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (“A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or
requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to
present at a meeting of the company’s shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as
possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow.”).
307. Id.
308. See generally DIR. OF CORPORATE FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF LEGAL
BULLETIN NO. 14
(CF), SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
(2001),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (outlining the procedural and substantive hurdles
that shareholders have to overcome to have their proposal sent with the corporation’s proxy
information).
309. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
310. See id. § 240.14a-8(i). Arguably, this may very well be a situation in which the
exception swallows the rule.
311. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(4).
312. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
313. See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 253, 294 (2009) (noting that this is especially true in the case of shareholder proposals on
social issues).
314. See id.; see also BREALEY ET AL., supra note 303, at 901.
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shareholder proposal.315 The petitioner requested inclusion of a shareholder
proposal to adopt a resolution “that napalm shall not be sold to any buyer
unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance that the substance will not be used
on or against human beings.”316 The SEC rejected the proposal request on the
basis that it was untimely.317 A year later, the petitioner renewed the
shareholder proposal and requested inclusion of a separate proposal adopting a
resolution to stop the company’s production of napalm.318 The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the Commission for review.319 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari; however, because the corporation ultimately decided
to include the shareholder proposal the matter was dismissed at moot.320 When
the corporation submitted the proposal for a shareholder vote, not even three
percent supported it.321
In Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the shareholder, Amelia
Roosevelt, appealed the district court’s decision supporting the exclusion of
her shareholder proposal from Du Pont’s proxy materials.322 The shareholder
proposal requested that the board of directors undertake two actions: “1.
[r]apidly accelerate plans to phase out CFC and halon production . . . [and]
2. [p]resent a report to shareholders within six months detailing (a) research
and development . . . efforts to find CFC and halon substitutes . . . and (b) a
marketing plan to sell those environmentally safe alternatives.”323
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision permitting Du Pont to exclude the shareholder’s proposal from the
company’s proxy materials.324 The court noted that both aspects of the
plaintiff’s proposal implicated the “‘ordinary business operations’
exception.”325 The court observed that the exception includes “‘certain matters
which have significant policy, economic or other implications inherent in
them.’”326 The court further noted that Roosevelt’s rapid phase-out proposal
would “no doubt reflect ‘significant policy’ when large [timing] differences are

315. 432 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
316. Id. at 662. The letter also stated that their “objections to the sale of this product [are]
primarily based on the concerns for human life inherent in our organization’s credo.” Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 663.
319. Id. at 682.
320. SEC v. Med. Com. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972).
321. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 11, at 689.
322. 958 F.2d 416, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
323. Id. at 417 n.1.
324. Id. at 429.
325. Id. at 426.
326. Id. (quoting Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders
Exchange Release Act No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976)).
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at stake.”327 However, the court pointed out that the interval of time originally
complained of by Roosevelt had been reduced significantly.328
In another case, Lovenheim v. Iroquois, Ltd., the shareholder filed a lawsuit
seeking inclusion of his proposed resolution.329 The shareholder proposed to
create a committee that would examine its French suppliers’ method of
producing paté de foie gras to ensure that it did not cause the geese involved in
production to suffer.330 At the time of the lawsuit, the corporation’s annual
revenues were $141 million with $6 million in profits and $78 million in
assets.331 In comparison, its sales of its paté de foie gras accounted for only
$79,000 in sales, which amounted to a net loss on paté sales.332
The company sought to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), which
provided that exclusion was appropriate
if the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5
percent of the issuer’s total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal
year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for
its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related
to the issuer’s business.333
Although the sales of paté de foie gras clearly met the exception, the court
nonetheless granted a preliminary injunction “in light of the ethical and social
significance” of the proposal.”334 The injunction barred the company from
excluding the shareholder proposal, which requested formation of a committee
to study the effects of the practice, from its proxy materials.335 One is left to
wonder: if courts are willing to entertain responsible behavior regarding the
treatment of a goose, why not do the same regarding the treatment of a human?
The derivative lawsuit is another device that shareholders use to change
corporate behavior.336 One court described the derivative suit as “one of the
most interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms for large formal
organizations.”337 Shareholders have invoked the derivative device to

327. Id. at 427.
328. Id. (noting that the company changed its timeline to phase out CFC products from five
years to one year).
329. 618 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1985).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 558.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5)
(1984)).
334. Id. at 561–62.
335. Id. at 562.
336. See Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the Shareholder Derivative Suit, 48
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–39 (1985) (discussing the development and use of derivative
suits).
337. Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988).
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challenge a board’s decisions.338
However, successfully invoking the
shareholder derivative device is one of the most daunting tasks facing a
shareholder.339
At common law, courts did not “permit stockholders to call corporate
managers to account in actions at law.”340 This refusal is premised on the
common function of state statutes: to empower directors to manage and direct
the affairs of the corporation.341 As a result, courts apply the business
judgment rule by refusing to reexamine a corporation’s decision by reasoning
that it is a matter that falls within the province of directorial discretion.342
The derivative action is an equitable remedy.343 It “provide[s] redress not
only against faithless officers and directors but also against third parties who
had damaged or threatened the corporate properties and whom the corporation
through its managers refused to pursue.”344 A shareholder seeking to invoke
the derivative device must satisfy prescribed requirements. Specifically, the
subject matter of the dispute must be of a derivative nature, demand must be
made upon the board of directors, and there must be a violation of a fiduciary
duty.345 To establish whether the subject matter is of a derivative nature, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette,
Inc. that the “issue must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who
suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders,
individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other
remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”346 Next, the
338. See, e.g., King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1141 (Del. 2011) (derivative
suit requiring a board to release records); In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
30 A.3d 60, 65 (Del. Ch. 2011) (derivative suit challenging the entire fairness of a proposed
merger).
339. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000) (dismissing a derivative
complaint because plaintiff failed to establish facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that
directors were disinterested); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (noting that a plaintiff-shareholder in a derivative suit alleging improper corporate
information gathering and reporting systems must show a suspicion that the board or senior
management violated the law).
340. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
341. See 2 FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 505.
342. See, e.g., Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir.
1992) (“Under this familiar rule of American jurisprudence, the courts refrain from second
guessing business decisions made by corporate directors in the absence of a showing of fraud,
unfairness or overreaching.”). The business judgment rule creates a presumption that directors
have acted in good faith unless the plaintiff can show fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion. See
Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,375, 92,284 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)).
343. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1948 (2011).
344. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534.
345. See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW & PRACTICE
§ 1.1 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
346. 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).

688

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:651

aggrieved shareholder must make a demand upon the directors to pursue the
derivative claim,347 and this requisite may only be excused in limited cases of
futility.348 Finally, a plaintiff-shareholder must allege that there is a breach of
an existing fiduciary duty.349 It is at this juncture where most, if not all, claims
of social responsibility will fail.
For example, in White v. Panic, the shareholders filed a derivative action
alleging that “the board of directors affirmatively refused to take any measures
to stop or sanction sexual misconduct by a corporate officer that allegedly
subjected the corporation to potential civil liability and expense.” 350 The
plaintiffs argued that the board used corporate funds to settle lawsuits against
the officer quietly.351 In affirming the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
dismissal, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the plaintiff’s complaint did
not show adequately that the board knew of the officer’s harassment and
refused to take proper steps to shield the corporation from liability.352
A plaintiff shareholder seeking to initiate a derivative action on the basis of a
CSR initiative faces almost certain doom from both a procedural and a
substantive basis. Derivative actions are problematic because a shareholder
must assert that the directors have failed to discharge their duty to the
corporation.353 Directors have no duty of social responsibility,354 and thus
should handily overcome a derivative action involving claims of CSR.
The Committee on Corporate Laws considered whether constituency
statutes, which allow directors to consider the interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders, should be included in the Model Business Corporation
Act.355 The committee concluded that such statutes were an inappropriate
mechanism for regulating corporate action, noting that they “would conflict
with directors’ responsibility to shareholders and could undermine the

347. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1831 (3d ed. 2007).
348. Id. (“The question is whether, given the composition and structure of the board, it would
be futile to expect it to respond to the shareholder’s concerns.”).
349. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 3, § 5923.30.
350. 783 A.2d 543, 546 (Del. 2001).
351. Id. at 548.
352. Id. at 553.
353. Gevurtz, supra note 38, at 386–87; see supra notes 345, 349 and accompanying text.
354. See David Rosenberg, Delaware’s “Expanding Duty of Loyalty” and Illegal Conduct: A
Step Toward Corporate Social Responsibility, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 81, 82 (2012) (positing
that expanding the fiduciary duty of loyalty may lead to a duty of CSR). However, thirty-one
states have allowed a corporation’s board of directors to consider the interests of constituents in
addition to interests of the corporation when making decisions. 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31
ann. (2008) (statutory comparison).
355. Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Corporate Law, supra note 22, at 2253.
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effectiveness of the system that has made the corporation an efficient device
for the creation of jobs and wealth.”356
Opponents of CSR can be expected to argue that directors may engage in
less than optimal decision making when considering CSR initiatives.357 As a
result, directors will be exposing themselves to the increased possibility of
litigation and arguably liability to any shareholders who oppose a CSR
initiative.358 Opponents of CSR may legitimately argue that CSR is really a
governmental policy and as such, it should be subject to the political process of
checks and balances.359 Moreover, critics may contend that by engaging in
CSR initiatives, corporate management is wasting valuable corporate
resources.360 Because CSR initiatives are vague and ambiguous, CSR
opponents assert that they are not capable of satisfying the divergent range of
interests.361 Finally, CSR opponents argue that CSR initiatives will cloud
management judgment with subjective preferences, which would make it
difficult for shareholders to evaluate management’s performance.362 Critics of
CSR initiatives opt for the perceived objective reality of
profitability—“perceived” because profitability is merely a sophisticated game
of financial assumptions under the auspices of GAAP.363
Doctrinal limitations hamper the use of corporate law as a tool for CSR
initiatives. Statutes empower directors, not shareholders, to manage the
Shareholder rights are limited to dividends,365 voting,366
company.364
informational rights,367 and rights of appraisal,368 and do not include any rights
356. Id. at 2268–70; see also Zipora Cohen, Directors’ Negligence Liability to Creditors: A
Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP. L. 351, 355 (2001).
357. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible”
Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 42 (2005) (suggesting that corporate managers could
then pursue personal interests in the name of CSR).
358. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2583, 2631 (2008) (“[M]anagers could still expose themselves to shareholder liability if the
alleged long term benefits [of CSR initiatives] are intangible enough and the sacrificed short term
profits are very large.”).
359. See id. at 2632 (reflecting on the benefits of leaving policy decisions to government).
360. See Gary van Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency
Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 466 (1994) (noting that those who favor
profit maximization as the goal of corporations regard expenditures on activities unrelated to
profit maximization as wasteful).
361. See Lee, supra note 357, at 42 (describing CSR as an “amorphous goal”); Piety, supra
note 358, at 2631.
(Aug.
19,
2006),
362. See
Tom
Borelli,
Club
CSR,
TOWNHALL.COM
http://townhall.com/columnists/tomborelli/2006/08/19/club_csr/page/full/.
363. See supra Part II.A.
364. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
365. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(a) (2011).
366. Id. § 7.21(a).
367. Id. § 16.02.
368. Id. § 13.02(a).
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for CSR initiatives. Corporate law is singularly limited to protecting the
economic rights of shareholders, safeguarding the institutional corporate
powers of the directors, and maximizing the value of the corporation. It does
not allow for consideration of affected third parties.
IV. PROPOSAL
Crafting any solution is a difficult task, but crafting a solution on matters
affecting one’s profitability is particularly daunting. The first step is to start a
dialogue about the role of the corporate enterprise and the public’s expectation
of that role. This inquiry requires a deep and considered look at both the social
benefits and social costs of the corporate enterprise. Any solution advanced by
CSR proponents must give serious consideration to providing the legislature
and the courts with enabling legislation. Anything short of this approach will
be pointless.
To that end, this Article sets forth a two-prong proposal to encourage
corporations to engage in socially responsible behavior. The first prong calls
upon the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)369 to enact
accounting legislation that will encourage corporations to act in a socially
responsible manner. The second prong calls upon Congress to enact tax
legislation that will encourage corporations to engage in socially responsible
action. This two-part proposal encourages corporations to act responsibly
while maintaining the twin goals of economic prosperity and social
responsibility.
A. The Role of Accounting Pronouncements in Shaping CSR
First, the PCAOB should adopt an accounting rule that allows corporations
engaging in socially responsible conduct to amortize the cost of socially
responsible initiatives over a reasonable number of periods, as opposed to
expensing the cost in one period. For example, capitalizing and amortizing the
costs of corrective action over a period of ten years will help incentivize
responsible corporate action.370 Accounting rules are flexible and permissive;
therefore, the PCAOB can draft such rules beyond the traditional profit-loss
dichotomy to include socially responsible actions.
Profitability is no longer solely a function of a successful corporate sales
operations; it is also a function of optimizing the choice of accounting policies.
369. The PCAOB “is a nonprofit corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of
public companies in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit reports.” PUB. COMPANY ACCT.
OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized the creation of the PCAOB. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010)).
370. Cf. 2009 FEDERAL TAX COURSE ¶ 707, at 290 (2008) (explaining that amortization is
used for intangible assets in the same manner depreciation is used for tangible assets).
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It is no secret that the choice of a particular revenue-recognition policy,
inventory method, or depreciation method affects a firm’s profitability.371
Corporate management chooses accounting policies in accordance with the
accounting principles promulgated by GAAP or IFRS.
Consider pension-plan accounting. Like most other accounting policies,
pension-plan accounting evolved from a simple cash-basis expense concept,
which recognized the expense when paid, into a sophisticated and complex
array of accrual-basis measurements, which recognize the expense when
incurred.372 Pension plans have been a part of the American economy since the
late nineteenth century.373
The collapse of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation in 1963 brought
pension plans to the nation’s attention.374 The Studebaker company’s pension
liabilities exceeded its available assets; therefore, it did not have the sufficient
assets to liquidate its pension-plan obligations when the company’s plant
closed.375 Although retirees received their full benefits, Studebaker was unable
to honor its pension obligations to younger employees.376 After the failure of
the Studebaker-Packard Corporation, Congress became concerned that many
American companies had either unfunded or underfunded pension liabilities.377
Until 1965, it had been a common practice for companies to leave the true
cost of pension expense unrecorded and unreported.378 In 1966, the
Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued APB Opinion No. 8, which marked
the first time that the accounting profession formally addressed pension-plan
accounting.379 APB Opinion No. 8 sought to change the accounting treatment
from a cash basis to an accrual basis.380 The opinion provided companies with
guidance in measuring and reporting a company’s pension liabilities381 and
371. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 176–79, 288–89, 312.
372. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 1026 & n.10.
373. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4840.
374. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683–84
(2001).
375. Id. at 726, 730.
376. Id. at 684.
377. Id. at 726.
378. KIESO ET AL., supra note 159, at 1026 (“The problem was that the amount paid or
funded in a fiscal period depended on financial management and was too often discretionary. For
example, funding could depend on the availability of cash, the level of earnings, or other factors
unrelated to the requirements of the plan.”); see also William C. Norby, Accounting for Financial
Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1979, at 18, 18.
379. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF PENSION PLANS, OPINION NO. 8, at 67–68 (1966), available at
http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/aicpa&CISOPTR=103&CISOSHO
W=64.
380. Id. at 69.
381. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 484 (recommending that the amount charged as
normal pension cost and the actual amount contributed to the fund should be reported on the
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justifications for choosing among alternatives for measuring and recording
pension liabilities.382
Companies had to account for two major pension costs: past-service costs
and current-year costs.383 APB Opinion No. 8 averred that an “unfunded prior
service cost is not a liability which should be shown in the balance sheet.”384
Ten percent of the past service cost should be included in the annual provision
for pension cost under the maximum-reporting method.385 Opponents of this
position argue that unfunded past-service costs can be quite substantial and,
therefore, should be funded immediately.386 Critics charged that it was still
possible under APB Opinion No. 8 to continue with unfunded pension
liabilities.387 APB Opinion No. 8 provided the accounting justification for
choosing among different expense methodologies.388
Nine years elapsed before Congress finally addressed the brewing
pension-funding crisis by enacting the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).389 ERISA established clear guidelines for
participation, vesting, and funding requirements for private pension
plans.390 However, the question of pension liability funding was not
completely resolved because ERISA permitted employers to
amortize
unfunded
past-service liability over thirty or forty years, depending on the type

company’s accounting sheets as an accrued pension liability). Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 87 superseded APB Opinion No. 8 in 1985 and provided that pension costs should
be disclosed on the corporate balance sheet. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 87: EMPLOYERS ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS 5
(1985), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs
&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820920574&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.
Statement of
Financial Accounting Standard No. 158 is the latest accounting statement concerning
pension-plan accounting and provides that companies with defined benefit plans must report the
difference between pension-plan assets and pension-plan obligations as an asset or liability. FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 158:
EMPLOYERS’ ACCOUNTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION AND OTHER POSTRETIREMENT
PLAN
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata
&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817798717&blobheader=application%2
Fpdf.
382. William C. Norby, Accounting for Financial Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug.
1981, at 22, 22.
383. See Patrick J. Regan, Potential Corporate Liabilities Under ERISA, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Mar.-Apr. 1970, at 26, 27.
384. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., supra note 379, at 76.
385. Id.
386. See HENDERIKSEN, supra note 87, at 481–82.
387. See, e.g., id. at 482.
388. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., supra note 379, at 73.
389. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006)).
390. 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 10 (2011).
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of employer and when the plan was created.391 After the passage of
ERISA, companies were still able to continue the practice of partially
recording and partially funding pension liabilities, demonstrating the
fluid nature of accounting pronouncements.
Similar to the flexible pension-accounting provisions, the PCAOB should
adopt accounting conventions that recognize the cost of past corrections and
report them in future periods. This will have the advantage of allowing the
corporation to correct the defect immediately and amortize the cost of the
defect into future periods. Adopting accounting rules that permit companies to
invest in and to amortize the cost of socially responsible action benefits both
the corporation and society. The corporation derives a benefit in the form of a
cost that is spread over a reasonable period of time, and society derives a
benefit in the form of corporate conduct designed to yield positive results.
Amending accounting rules to allow amortization of the cost of CSR initiatives
is reasonable and justifiable.
B. The Role of Tax Law in Shaping CSR
Congress should also use tax law to encourage corporations to engage in
socially responsible behavior. Since the enactment of the Internal Revenue
Code in 1913, Congress has passed a series of tax initiatives aimed at
encouraging behavior that would yield positive benefits for American society.
Congress’s most prominent use of tax law is providing for tax incentives
aimed at stimulating economic activity. Business tax incentives aimed to
encourage capital investment and economic development include the
Investment Tax Credit,392 the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit,393 and the Orphan
Drug Tax Credit.394 Additional business tax incentives include granting
businesses favorable tax deductions in the form of accelerated depreciation,395
elections to expense certain costs,396 and granting deductions for intangible
costs that otherwise would be subject to capitalization.397 Congress also has
provided individual tax incentives aimed at stimulating behavior. For

391. ERISA § 303(b)(2)(B).
392. 26 U.S.C. § 46 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
393. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/HRD-91-33, TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT, EMPLOYER ACTIONS TO RECRUIT, HIRE, AND
RETAIN ELIGIBLE WORKERS VARY 2 (1991).
394. 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This law gives a fifty-percent tax credit for
any expenditures on any medical clinical testing for creating drugs to treat orphan diseases.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ORPHAN DRUG
ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 4 (2001).
395. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
396. Id. § 179.
397. Id. § 197.

694

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:651

example, Congress provided individuals with a homeowner tax credit398 and
the Hope Education Tax Credit.399
Most notably, tax law has also been invoked to combat repugnant behavior.
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court’s application of
tax law shaped behavior repugnant to social values.400 The Court heard
challenges by Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian School, which
challenged the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) denial of their tax-exempt
status.401
Bob Jones University, a religious and educational institution, barred African
Americans from admission until 1971.402 In 1971, the school began to accept
applications from African Americans who had an African-American spouse.403
The university’s opposition to interracial dating and marriage motivated this
policy.404 In 1975, the university admitted unmarried African Americans, but
still prohibited interracial dating.405
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. was a religious and educational institution
that offered instruction for all grades and gave particular emphasis to Christian
teachings.406 Goldsboro Christian Schools accepted only Caucasian students
as a matter of course, but occasionally would admit a multiracial applicant if
one parent was Caucasian.407
Earlier, in 1970, the IRS had reasoned that “it could ‘no longer legally
justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3)] to private schools which
practice racial discrimination.’”408 The IRS thus had denied tax-exempt status
to both schools to “discourage racial discrimination in education.”409 In
reviewing the challenges by both schools, the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s holding in favor of the government.410 The Supreme Court
declared that “[s]ection 501(c)(3) . . . must be analyzed and construed within
the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the
Congressional purposes.”411 The Supreme Court was persuaded by the
compelling social purpose that Congress pursued in the elimination of racial
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
1970)).
409.
410.
411.

Id. § 36.
Id. § 25A.
See generally 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
Id. at 577–85.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 574 (quoting I.R.S. News Release, 7 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6790 (July 10,
Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 586.
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discrimination.412 The Supreme Court noted that “Congress sought to provide
tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of
private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the
place of public institutions of the same kind.”413
In similar fashion, Congress should adopt tax-related legislation that
discourages corporations from engaging in repugnant behavior that harms the
public and that is reasonably avoidable. Specifically, Congress should adopt
legislation requiring companies to demonstrate that (1) they took reasonable
steps to safeguard products before such products are placed into the stream of
commerce or (2) they took immediate action upon learning of a defect if such
defect is discovered after the product enters the stream of commerce.
Companies that fail to demonstrate that they took reasonable steps to safeguard
products or immediate action upon learning of a defect must pay an excise tax
on all product-line sales. Limited exemptions would be available for start-up
companies, wholly service-oriented companies, and small-cap companies with
limited distribution capabilities. The IRS, by regulation, can designate safe
harbors that satisfy the “reasonable steps” standard. Additionally, if a
company refuses to pay the excise tax, the IRS would have the authority to
advance monies to the fund and charge the corporation or, alternatively, assess
the amount of the unpaid tax against a “responsible person,” such as an officer
of the corporation.414 Acquirers of stock or assets of the corporation known to
have excise tax penalties shall become secondarily liable in the event that the
corporation fails to satisfy its obligation. The IRS thus should impose the
excise tax on a purchaser of stock or assets in the event the transferor fails to
satisfy their liability. The IRS should use the excise tax to establish a litigation
fund for plaintiffs alleging damages caused by unsafe products.415 This
approach is reasonable because the corporation is best able to demonstrate that
it took reasonable steps to safeguard products placed into the stream of
commerce.
IV. CONCLUSION
A common assumption of those who make public-policy decisions is that
economic efficiency, the condition of obtaining the most benefit for the least
cost,416 is a good standard to justify policy choices. The idea of economic
412. Id. at 603–04.
413. Id. at 588.
414. Cf. Employment Taxes and the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP), INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=108357,00.html (last updated
Feb. 8, 2012).
415. See, e.g., The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REG. &
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/laws/osltf.html (last updated
Sept. 24, 2010).
416. See Paul Heyne, Efficiency, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra
note 4, at 136, 137.
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efficiency finds a natural home in a free-market economy that “allows each
person to satisfy his or her preferences in such a way as to give that person the
greatest freedom, personal autonomy of choice, and utility of outcome.”417
Efficiency is optimal when the parties have relatively equal bargaining power,
and thus each party will seek to maximize his or her own advantage.
However, the idea of economic efficiency within the context of unrestrained
free-market capitalism warrants reexamination. The economic-efficiency
standard needs to be considered in light of the economic and structural barriers
that now protect the corporate enterprise at the expense of the public.
Efficiency becomes suboptimal when relative bargaining powers become
increasingly disproportionate, when choices are limited, or when costs are
externalized. As the gap between efficiency gains on one side and efficiency
losses on the other widens, the transactions inevitably translate into an overall
inefficiency gap negatively affecting society. As a result, inefficiency losses
become counterproductive to society as a whole. In short, responsibility is
traded for efficiency.
The current legal structure strongly discourages—if not unequivocally
prohibits—corporations from considering their impact on a third party. To
invoke the judicial protection, courts must first ascertain a statutory or
common-law duty. Without a positive duty to act, corporations are left to their
own devices as to what constitutes acceptable behavior. Directors will pursue
the path of profitability to avoid shareholders’ allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty. Even with a majority of socially minded directors, absent a
positive duty to act, directors will err on the side of caution and continue on the
path of profit maximization. It is not for lack of desire that a director may fail
to act; rather it is what the law requires and what shareholders expect: that
directors aim to maximize firm profitability.
As two distinguished
commentators write,
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory
laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the
importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names for
disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice
in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based
on the supposition that managers not only may but also should
violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.418
To reverse more than a century’s worth of jurisprudence and commercial
expectations will require legislative action; anything short is insufficient.
Every person, individual and corporation alike, has the right to earn a profit.
This is an indisputable premise of American society. Corporations, as
417. Introduction to THE MORAL DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY CHOICE: BEYOND THE
MARKET PARADIGM 5, 5 (John Martin Gillroy & Maurice Wade eds., 1992).
418. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982).
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possessors of capital, are particularly adept at exploiting the accumulation of
capital. However, the ownership of capital does not give its possessor the
unfettered right to take risks or engage in conduct that creates an
uncompensated cost to society while creating a benefit for the corporation and
its shareholders. Adding enforceable elements of social responsibility is the
next chapter in the evolutionary process of the corporate enterprise.
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EXHIBIT NO. 2

Toyota’s Internal Memorandum available at: James R. Healy & Sharon Silke
Carty, Internal Toyota Memo Surfaces on Saving Safety, USA
http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2010-02-21-toyota-recallTODAY,
documents_N.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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